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Cooperation and Dialogue with Islamist Organizations |
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Pursuant to Hamas’s victory and winning of the second PLC seats, proposals mounted to initiate dialogue and cooperation with Islamist movement. Some, however, utterly refuse any cooperation or dialogue based on previous experiences that were not free of clashes and even animosity with Islamist movements, focusing on the major political difference: the PLO representing all of the Palestinian people in the Diaspora and elsewhere in addition to numerous confrontations during the first popular uprising (1987 – 1992) or based on loser’s dignity with a wish to trap the winner with overtaking power solitarily to face all issues related to the relationship with the occupation and management of daily life of the population while others started supporting the initiation of dialogue and cooperation relying on two aspects:
- Many of the municipal councils’ members won for being on Hamas’s list although it is well known that most of such winners do not necessarily stand for ideological Islamic lines; for them, running as candidates on Hamas’s list was the only alternative available to many prominent figures.
- The need to transfer administrative experience and encounters that faced those in the decision-making positions rather than wasting time and delaying provision of services until maturation of managerial and ideological experience of new members.
- The increasing announcements made by senior Hamas leaders – after being surprised by their victory in the PLC and being obliged to form the new Palestinian government and not being merely restricted to an opposition – about their readiness to deal in a pragmatic way with many issues. This could be a sign of hope, albeit little, on their readiness to be as prepared to handle other social challenges such as the spread of drugs, violence against women and children, school drop-outs, early marriages and other developmental subsequences.
Therefore, any dialogue with Islamist organizations and forces in the near or distant future should rely on the following principles and convictions:
- The Palestinian Basic Law - which the winning Islamic forces cannot change as they do not have a two-third majority in the Council, necessary to introduce any such changes. Municipalities, regardless of their size and status, cannot modify or interfere in legislation; their duties are limited to providing basic services like water, sewage and other public utilities. The Basic Law prescribes that Islam is “a source” of legislation and not the basic or only source of legislation to leave it open to the state of Palestine to adhere to international conventions on human rights, whether the rights of children or women, which is the demand for which many of the Palestinian people sectors have struggled. Such a struggle left a legacy with an echo although not coherent at all times.
- The strong secular patrimony – in spite of the flagrant loss of the parties and lists of such current – it remains that, at least in appearance, no other religious ideological force may go back in history – at least in a quick manner – whereas youth and women’s openness to the demands of the market in labor, education, clothing and individual freedom and not only the openness imposed by the State of Israel as an occupation, but rather by the Arab social experiences, which are relatively open as seen on TV screens and numerous satellite channels.
- The historically religious plurality in Palestine although Christians’ percentage is decreasing, makes that there has always been excellent religious cohabitation that will always resist any fundamental religious impositions from one party on the other.
As regards dialogue with the Islamists and women’s issues, the situation will not be different from the dialogue on any other social issues as regards the previously-stated bases. The leadership of women’s movement will add a basic principle to the dialogue based on a large space of maneuver and not bargaining as Palestinian feminist movement will depend in its struggle on the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and on the Palestinian Declaration of Independence that has set forth the legal basis of numerous women’s struggles, including achieving positive discrimination in favor of women’s representation in decision-making positions in the Local and Legislative Elections Law. Will it be possible for Islamist women with their Islamist party to change a law that enabled them taste power and become decision-makers at local and national level!
It is of course a question with many answers, but time, action and courageous and constructive dialogue shall remain the basis through which we shall evaluate the results and the tracks of development in the Palestinian society in future years.
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